We introduce a decision-making model based on value functions that include individualistic utility function and socio-constructivistic norm function, and propose a norm-fostering process that recursively updates norm function through mutual recognition between the self and others. As an example, we will look at the resource-sharing problem typical of economic activities and assume the distribution of individual actions to define the (1) norm function fostered through mutual comparison of value/action ratio based on the equity theory (progressive tax-like), (2) norm function proportional to resource utilization (proportional tax-like) and (3) fixed norm function independent of resource utilization (fixed tax-like). And, by carrying out numerical simulation, we will show that the progressive tax-like norm function (i) does not increase disparity for the distribution of the actions, unlike the other norm functions, and (ii) has high resource productivity and low Gini coefficient, i.e., the progressive tax-like norm function has the highest sustainability and fairness.
Introduction
In various countries of the world, social problems, such as disparity and inequality problems among individuals, regions, and countries, energy problems related to dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power accidents, and environmental problems related to global warming and environmental pollution, are emerging. To solve these social problems and aim for a sustainable, fair and inclusive society, we cannot avoid consideration of social norms in a broad sense such as fairness, equity, goodness, justice, obligation, morality and ethics. The subjects of our research are how to incorporate the concept of social norms and ethics into the idea of rational decision making which was mainstream in economics and political science, how to understand and diagnose actions of individuals and groups in real society, and further how to intervene in the social system.
The major challenge in practically approaching social problems, in addition to interpreting and diagnosing individual and group actions in the real world from both aspects of utility and norm, is creating a prescription while making a prognosis based on the diagnosis, and determining how to intervene into the social system, i.e., how to, so to speak, clinically and medically treat the social system. The conventional social intelligence paradigms are based on physical models for explaining phenomena and predicting the future based on analysis of data obtained from the phenomena, as well as on historical models for explaining origins and preventing future disasters based on analysis of history, from the past to the present. However, human economy and society are complex systems composed entirely of various interacting components, and are considered as autopoietic systems that bring about a cyclic network between components and generational changes in the components, as described by Niklas Luhmann in his social systems theory (Luhmann, 1996) . Dealing with human society, which is a complex and constantly changing cyclic system, requires clinical medical models that carry out intervention based on continuous diagnosis and prognosis, rather than reductionist physical models or historical models that rely on transient phenomena, and necessitates the building of co-evolutionary relationships between the real world and practical intervention.
3 Therefore, prior to making diagnosis and prescriptions, we sought to clarify what social norms are needed by a sustainable and fair society, and, in terms of economics, what social norms should be set against general utility theories.
Going back to the past, Adam Smith said "He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."
in "The Wealth of Nations" (Smith, 1776) . In support of this prediction, Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu et al. proved that society reaches its optimum state when the contract is complete and all individuals pursue their own self-interests as the first fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
On the other hand, Smith said "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Smith, 1759) . Arrow said "I want, however, to conclude by calling attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes. I suggest as one possible interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures. " as to how a complete contract cannot exist in real society (Arrow, 1970) .
As examples of previous research on social norms taking over the discussion of Smith and Arrow, philosopher Joseph Heath has proposed the adoption of normative appropriateness as deontic constraints into a rational choice model based on the expected utility theory for decision making (Heath, 2008) . Economist Kaushik Basu has acknowledged the existence of subjective moral costs in decision making (Basu, 2010) . Economist Masahiko Aoki has shown that community norms emerge intrinsically when the cost for cooperation is smaller than the loss from social ostracization, by linking the commons game and social exchange game (Aoki, 2001) . Economist Samuel Bowles has forwarded the importance of moral motivation and social preference in markets based on incomplete contracts (Bowles, 2017) . The common viewpoint of these researches is that they all point out the need for incorporating social norms, which include morals and ethics, not only economic utility, into individual decision-making models.
Previous research dealt with the expected utility theory, prospect theory, etc. as individual decisionmaking models in microeconomics (e.g. Gilboa, 2010) , with altruism and reciprocity through various game experiments in experimental economics (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 2013) , and with 4 axiomatic characterization of institutionalized mechanisms as normative and ethical approaches in welfare economics (e.g. Sen, 2017) . For example, the expected utility theory discusses risk-averse type and risk-seeking type utility function forms in making decisions to maximize the expected value of utility for choices under conditions of uncertainty. The prospect theory explains reference points and loss aversion (non-linearity) in making decisions based on utility functions that are assigned with weights for probability weighting function. The game theory expresses utility functions, for example, using a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix, ultimatum game logic tree, and public goods game allocation rules, and discusses the Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium for decision-making strategies. Welfare economics proposes theorems pertaining to competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency based on completeness and transitivity axioms, and also formulates mappings from sets of individuals and economic environments to sets of individual goods and capabilities using ordinal utility functions based on profiles of individual preference orders and resource-use capabilities, in order to come up with standards pertaining to game forms and social welfare as institutionalized mechanisms. Needless to say, these theories have contributed significantly to society and economics. This study, however, aims to determine the concrete effects to sustainability, fairness, disparity, etc. of explicitly incorporating cardinal norm functions in decision-making models, towards creating a better society, and to clarify how to foster norms in social systems when carrying out social practices.
In this paper, in Chapter 2 we will introduce a value function that includes utility function of methodological individualism and norm function of social constructivism, and propose a process for fostering norm functions based on the establishment of social norms from the standpoint of cultural evolutionary and social institutional theories. In Chapter 3, we will carry out numerical simulation using a resource-sharing problem typical of economic activities involving the production, allocation, and consumption of goods and services from resources in the natural environment, and compare the norm functions fostered through the process proposed in Chapter 2 with a few other predefined norm functions, in terms of society's total value, resource productivity, and the Gini coefficient. In Chapter 4, we will assess the simulation results obtained in Chapter 3 in terms of statistical theories on asset distribution in physical economics, and discuss the ideal state of an economic society needed to suppress disparity and inequality, while considering social trends and history of currencies and values. And, in Chapter 5, we will summarize our conclusions and discuss future issues and prospects in aiming for sustainability and fairness. 5
Decision-making model

Value function
A major decision-making theory is the rational choice theory in microeconomics. It is based on the principle that individuals choose the rational action that maximizes utility based on methodological individualism. This theory is related to Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, one of the mainstream schools of thought in economics claiming that society will attain its optimum state if individuals pursue their self-interests. We will not discuss them all here, but this theory has been applied into the expected utility theory, subjective probability theory, prospect theory, and other theories pertaining to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and risk, and has been widely used in game theory as application into sociology and political science, as well as in social choice theory, public choice theory, and comparative institutional analysis.
In the standard rational choice model, during decision-making, the individual assigns a confidence level to beliefs in particular states, allocates cardinal priority criteria to desires for particular results, and maximizes the expected utility of the action. In the decision tree well-known for decision making, the individual prunes the s ( ) based on beliefs, and prunes the ( ) based on desires. The individual utility function ( ( )) is expressed in equation (1) below, i.e., for every outcome ( ), multiply the utility of ( ( )) by the probability of given ( ), ( ( | )), then add these all up (Heath 2008) . The individual chooses the action ( ) that maximizes the utility function ( ( )).
As an argument against the rational choice theory, some authors claim that it does not take into consideration that the individual makes altruistic and obligatory actions against his/her selfinterests. For example, the experimental game theory pertaining to the collective action problem has proven that subjects exhibit cooperation and coordination at levels considerably higher than those predicted by the standard model. This is because humans socially learn and follow social norms, including language, customs, and culture, through imitative conformity (Heath, 2008) . From the standpoint of economics, the opportunity set of the individual's action is greater than the budget set of the goods, and the Invisible Hand theorem does not always lead society to its optimum state. It 6 can be said, however, that society is established because social norms restrict the opportunity set of the individual's actions (Basu, 2010) .
So far, in an attempt to incorporate social norms into rational choice models, for example, adding an increase in utility to the kindness of others (Rabin, 1993) , or adding a reduction of utility to the degree of inequality between oneself and others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) have been considered.
However, modifications that add the benefits of interaction with others to the utility function can not account for a wide range of norms and anonymous cooperative behavior. Also, among the several versions of reciprocity altruism, direct reciprocity can not explain broad sociality without direct relationship. Indirect reciprocity has primary dilemma (why cooperate?) and secondary dilemma (why do expensive sanctions?). In order to solve these dilemmas, it is necessary to further assume higher order sanctions, or linking primary and secondary cooperative actions (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Yamagishi and Tahakashi, 1994) , but still these reasons can not be explained. Strong reciprocity describes the norms of cooperation by assuming the willingness to do costly altruistic punishment as a result of group selection (Bowles and Gintis, 2011) , but can not explain other norms such as fairness. Empirical studies of reciprocity have shown that high-order sanctions and heavy punishment are not observed, and that inexpensive sanctions (e.g. break-off of relations, light attention, etc.) are the main (Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Guala, 2012) .
Therefore, in incorporating social norms into rational choice models, we would like to reconsider from two major perspectives: deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology according to Immanuel Kant, humans are expected to follow universal moral rules dictated by reason, and good will is an action only based on following one's faith, wherein norms and ethics do not be reduced to utility.
On the other hand, in utilitarianism, the social desirability of an action is determined by utility, and the goal is to maximize the summation of individual utility ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number"), wherein norms and ethics are embedded in utility.
Although deontology is based on reason, this reason or rational thinking, from the perspective of social constructivism, is socially constructed along with the norms, such as language, customs, and culture. Norm conformity develops through imitative learning during childhood and social learning from the cultural environment, and cannot be isolated from the rational subject. A simple method for incorporating deontological constraints for actions into the rational choice model, in the same way as with utilities for desires, is by handling norms based on reason as instruments (Heath, 2008) .
In accordance with Savage's trichotomy (states, actions and outcomes), the normative principle connected to the actions are conceived in the same way as the beliefs connected to the states and the outcomes connected to the desires, and normative appropriateness is assigned as weight in considering actions. Therefore, the individual's value function ( ( )) can be expressed as the sum of utility ( ( )) and normative appropriateness ( ( )), as shown in equation (2).
From the perspective based on utilitarianism, examples of social norms are community norms that serve as self-enforcing solutions to the commons problem (Aoki, 2001) . In this case, the emergence of community norms can be seen by linking the commons game and the social exchange game. The value function ( ( )) can be expressed from the utility ( ( )) and cooperation cost ( ( )) in the commons domain, such as in common water supplies and commonly owned forests, and the utility ( ( )) and cooperation cost ( ( )) in the social exchange domain, such as in mutual aid and cooperative, as shown in equation (3). The incentive condition for cooperation can be expressed by equation (4), with the current cooperation cost saving terms on the left-hand side, and the current value conversion (where is the discount factor) of the loss term arising from permanent social ostracization in the future on the right-hand side. When this condition holds true, the common expectation against social ostracization of neglects generates a cooperative community norm.
We derived the mathematical equations (2) and (3) for a rational choice model that incorporates social norms from both the standpoints of deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology, norms are shown as intrinsic values by instrumentally treating deontic constraints due to reason. On the other hand, in utilitarianism, the utility of the social exchange that underlies the norm is shown as extrinsic value. Their mathematical expressions, although having different premises, are similar and can therefore be treated equally when incorporating them as information model for social practices.
In equation (2), when the preference order for relative to ( ) is opposite that of the preference order for relative to ( ), or when ( ) is expressed as an increasing function of , and ( ) is expressed as a decreasing function of , then ( ) becomes a cost and constraint. In equation (3), − ( ) and − ( ), to begin with, are costs and constraints relative to utility function ( ) + ( ). Since ( ) in equation (2) and − ( ) − ( ) in equation (3) can be treated equally, we will use mainly equation (2) in discussions hereinafter. If the normative cost ( ( )) is redistributed as tax to society, or ( ) is assumed as cooperating cost ( ( ) + ( )) in social exchange, deontology can also be regarded as being reduced to social utility.
Norm-fostering process
Individuals are not born with inherent social norms but acquire them through norm conformity, wherein norm functions are formed separately for each person. How, then, are norm functions formed? The establishment of social norms can be viewed from two major standpoints; namely, the cultural evolutionary theory and the social institutional theory. The cultural evolutionary theory explains the establishment of norms as part of the dual inheritance system that arises from the coevolution of genetic/biological transmission and cultural/social transmission. The social institutional theory explains the establishment of norms as part of an institutional system arising from a cycling between the individual's propensity and actions and the group's conditions and symbolisms.
Joseph Heath claims that humans learn norms along with language, customs, and culture through a genetically endowed propensity toward conformity and imitative social learning based on those propensities, in accordance with the gene-culture dual inheritance theory of Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd (Richerson and Boyd, 2005) , and that the norms cannot be isolated from the human rational and intentional thinking. Moreover, Heath also argues that explicit rules are merely derived from norms based on regulism, which equates norms with explicit rules (e.g. signs), and that arbitrary boundaries can be made for actions to an unlimited extent based on regularism, which equates norms with regularities of actions (e.g. behavior patterns). In accordance with Robert
Brandom's interpretation of the origin of norms (Brandom, 1994) , he claims that norms are enforced by the structure for mutual expectations and reciprocal sanctions based on the norm conformity concept forwarded by Richerson and Boyd (Heath, 2008) .
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev revised and expanded the institutional model based on Masahiko Aoki's comparative institutional analysis (Aoki, 2001) to present a recursive institutional system wherein: individual propensities trigger actions, the summation of the interaction of individual actions generates a state of equilibrium as the group's shared expectation, a symbol system is brought about as the summary expression of the state of equilibrium, and the symbols affect the individual propensities. And, similar to Brandom's Hegelian solution (Brandom, 2009) , the basis for the generation of the group's state of equilibrium from the interaction of individuals lies in the mutual recognition between the subject of self and of others (recognition), wherein: the 9 human mind is composed of the subject (agent) and the object (action), the subject performs actions as objects (performativity), and the objects influence the subjects in a manner that establishes social consistency (continuity) (Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, 2016) .
Summarizing the views of Heath, Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev, we can say that social norms are fostered through the cyclic repetition of mutual expectation and recognition between the self and others. We therefore propose the model shown in Figure 1 as a process for fostering norm functions. The individual value function ( ( )) shown in equation (2) 
Resource-sharing problem
Problem setting
Broadly speaking, economic activities pertain to the acquisition of resources from the natural environment, and production, allocation, and consumption of goods and services. To determine the effects of social norms on sustainability, fairness, disparity, etc., we looked at the resource-sharing problem as a typical example of economic activities. The resource-sharing problem is a typical example pertaining to the competition for shared resources related to disparity and inequality in production activities, allocation of resources and energy, traffic congestion, and the supply chain. It is also a problem that encompasses the tragedy of commons, which deals with the competition problem between producers for shared resources; the public goods game, which deals with the contribution problem for cooperation cost for public benefits; and the community norm problem based on the linking game for public goods and social exchange (Aoki, 2001) ; and can therefore be considered as a mathematical model for the cardinal computation of these problems.
The resource-sharing problem deals with the problem of the use of shared resources by each individual to gain profits. Since the resource unit price increases when the total amount of used resources increases, a state of equilibrium in the group arises between the maximization of selfvalue through the use of more resources by each individual and the increase in the resource unit price of the entire group. The state of equilibrium arises when each individual tries to maximize self-value. The resource-sharing problem can be expressed as a distributed constraint optimization problem as shown in equation (6), where is total number of persons in the group, is the resource used by individual ( = 1, 2, ⋯ , ), ( ) is the value function, and is the total cost function determined by the total used resources (e.g. Boyd et al., 2011) .
For setting a concrete problem, is expressed as the resource used by individual and as the total resources used by the group (equation (7)), and unit price for resource is expressed as (equation (8)). The resource unit price is the result of adding the constant to the product of the coefficient and total resource raised to the power of . Exponent is > 1, and expresses the effect of increasing costs. As shown in equation (9), the profit, i.e., the utility function ( ), of individual is the result of subtracting the product of used resources ( ) and resource unit price ( ) from the 11 product of resource ( ) raised to the power of and action ( ) of individual . Action ( ) of individual can be interpreted as the production capacity relative to the resources, as the potential for handling the resources, or as the effort needed to obtain profit from the resources. Exponent is < 1, and expresses the effect of diminishing returns. As shown in equation (10), the combination of equations (7) to (9) corresponds to equation (6), which represents the original distributed optimization problem.
Thus far, we have shown equations using only utility function ( ). To incorporate social norms, we will replace the utility function ( ) shown in equation (9) with the value function incorporating norm function shown in equation (2). To compare the effect of norm, we set three value functions
( 1 , 2 , 3 ) as shown in equations (11) to (13). For the value function 1 in equation (11), we set the norm function multiplied with the norm coefficient 1 , which differs for each individual ( ) relative to used resource ( ). This norm coefficient ( 1 ) is fostered through mutual expectation and recognition with others, as shown in Figure 1 and equation (5). Here, using criteria based on the equity theory (Adams, 1963) as the criteria for mutual comparison, as show in equation (14), through the norm-fostering process, the value/action ratio ( 1 [ ]⁄ ) for individual ( ) is mutually compared with number of other persons connected in a social relationship network (shown in Figure 3 below), and the norm ( 1 [ ]) is gradually updated into ( 1 [ + 1]) in ∆ steps. As will be demonstrated in the results of simulation in Section 3.2, the last term of equation (11) can be considered as a progressive tax-like cost (however, it should be noted that the result is a progressive tax-like, not an ex-post cost redistribution by tax collection, but an ongoing cost distribution by interaction between individuals). For 2 in equation (12), we set the norm function multiplied with the norm coefficient 2 , which is a constant ratio relative to used resources ( ). The last term of equation (12) is a proportional tax-like (consumption tax) cost. For 3 in equation (13), we set the norm coefficient 3 , which is a fixed value regardless of used resources ( ). The last term of equation (13) is a fixed tax-like cost. The sum of the normative cost for the group (the so-called total tax revenue) is expressed in equations (15) to (17) respectively for value functions 1 , 2 , 3 of equations (11) to (13).
Although the resource-sharing problem is a distributed optimization problem for the group, it is a rational choice problem for maximizing value functions ( Moreover, the computational flows for value functions 2 3 of equations (12) and (13) are similar to the computational flow shown in Figure 2 , except for the absence of update of norm coefficients and the computation of optimum value following equations (19) and (20), respectively. 
Numerical simulation
We conducted actual numerical simulation by setting the total number of persons in the group to 100 ( = 100), and set the social relationship network for individual ( ( = 1, 2, ⋯ , )) assuming a scale-free network topology, as shown in Figure 3 . A scale-free network is a network topology that is commonly seen in Internet and literature citation relationships, as well as in social relationships. Figure 3 is an example of a scale-free network with 100 nodes and 2 degrees generated using the famous Barabási-Albert model.
The distribution of actions ( ( = 1, 2, ⋯ , )) of individual ( ) is set as two types of distribution, namely, the normal distribution and power-law distribution, as shown in Figure 4 . For the normal distribution, which is widely observed for academic grades, body height, and production capability, in Figure 4 , the average value for action ( ) is set to ̅ = = 0.5, standard deviation to = 0.1, and histogram bin to ⊿ = 0.025. The power-law distribution is a long-tail distribution widely observed for populations, incomes, and assets. In Figure 4 , the probability density function for power-law distribution is set to 1 4 ⁄ • − , and = 2, since the scaling exponent for income or asset distribution is empirically usually 2. Also, since the average value has no meaning in the power-law distribution, the median value is set to ̃= 0.5 in accordance with the average value ( ̅)
in the normal distribution, and the histogram bin to ⊿ = 0.025 as with the normal distribution.
The calculation parameter set points are set to: equation (8) Figure 5 shows the results of simulation using value function 1 (progressive tax-like, value/action ratio) of equation (11), 2 (proportional tax-like) of equation (12), and 3 (fixed tax-like) of equation (13), for the normal distribution and power-law distribution of individual ( ) action ( ).
The three graphs on the left side of Figure 5 follow a normal distribution, while the three graphs on the right side follow a power-law distribution, with the upper two graphs corresponding to value function 1 , the middle two graphs to 2 , and the lower two graphs to 3 . The vertical axis of each graph indicates value function ( 1 , 2 , 3 ( = 1, 2, ⋯ , )), and the horizontal axis indicates repetition number ( ). Here, to compare between the same type of distribution, for the normal distribution, we adjusted the values of 2 and 3 in accordance with the computation results for 1 so that the sum of normative cost (total tax revenue) shown in equations (15) to (17) will be equal, i.e., 1 = 2 = 3 ≃ 1.85. Likewise, for the power-law distribution, we adjusted the values so that 1 = 2 = 3 ≃ 1.62. All the graphs show that the value for value functions ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) converge as the number of repetitions ( ) for recursive computation increase. the second two graphs show the distribution for value function 1 (progressive tax-like), the third 16 two graphs for 2 (proportional tax-like), and the fourth (lowermost) two graphs for 3 (fixed taxlike). From Figures 5 and 6 , we can see that for both normal and power-law distributions, in contrast to the distribution of individual ( ) action ( ), the distribution of value ( ) widens as norms shift from progressive tax-like norm ( 1 ), to proportional tax-like norm ( 2 ), and to fixed tax-like norm ( 3 ),
i.e., the disparity among individuals widens. Comparing normal distribution and power-law distribution shows that the power-law distribution has a wider spread compared to the normal distribution. As shown in Figure 7 , plotting the value ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) against action ( ) shows that value 1 is proportional to action ( ) for the progressive tax-like norm ( 1 ), whereas values 2 3 exhibit the square function of action ( ) for the proportional tax-like norm ( 2 ) and fixed tax-like norm ( 3 ), indicating an expanding disparity for these two norms.
Values ( 2 , 3 ) exhibit square functions for norm 2 and norm 3 because the exponent (1 (1 − ⁄ ) (s = 0.5) in equations (19) and (20) is a square. This means that when the utility function diminishes, the disparity tends to widen. As shown in Figure 8 , values 1 for norm 1 do not exhibit a square function but a linear function because the normative cost based on the fairness criteria increases proportionally relative to the action ( ), which in turn suppresses disparity.
However, looking at Figure 8 , we can see that the normative costs for norm 1 and norm 2 are almost equal; indicating that disparity might also be suppressed in norm 2 . Figure 9 clearly shows, however, that in the upper end of the distribution of action ( ), norm 2 has significantly smaller norm coefficient than norm 1 , which is the opposite for the lower end. Because of this, as is evident in equations (11) and (12) and equations (18) and (19), values 2 for norm 2 enlarge to almost the square of action ( ) in the upper end of the distribution of action ( ) compared to norm 1 , while, conversely, normative cost enlarges to almost the square of action ( ) in the lower end.
Disparity, therefore, is wider for the proportional tax-like norm ( 2 ). and proportional tax-like norm 2 compared to the progressive tax-like norm 1 , as well for the power-law distribution compared to the normal distribution. In other words, the fixed tax-like norm Figure 11 shows the resource productivity (total value/total resource ratio) computed from the total value and total resources shown in Figure 10 and the Gini coefficients computed from distribution of value ( ). Progressive tax-like norm ( 1 ) has the highest resource productivity compared to fixed tax-line norm ( 3 ) and proportional tax-like norm ( 2 ). In terms of the Gini coefficients, compared to the other two norms, progressive tax-like norm ( 1 ) has the lowest coefficient, which is the same as the Gini coefficient of the original distribution of action ( ) (dotted line in the figure) . This means that progressive tax-like norm ( 1 ) has the highest sustainability in terms of the efficient use of resources, and has the highest fairness and suppression of disparity in terms of maintaining and preventing the increase of the Gini coefficient. Moreover, although this section only presents results of simulation for a single set of conditions for social relationship network, individual action distribution, and calculation parameters, it should be noted that the tendencies for the results given in this section would remain the same even if the conditions are changed. Figure 10 Comparison of total values and total resources for action distributions and norms. Figure 11 Comparison of resource productivities and Gini coefficients.
Discussions
Review of Results
Results of numerical simulation using the resource-sharing problem as a typical example of economic activities have shown that the progressive tax-like norm function fostered through the mutual comparison of value/action ration based on the equity theory has higher resource productivity and lower Gini coefficient than proportional tax-like or fixed tax-like norm functions.
In other words, it is the most preferable norm function in terms of sustainability and fairness. Also, considering the negative correlation between the Gini coefficient and the human development index developed by Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq (Holden et al., 2014) , the progressive tax-like norm function is also preferable in terms of the individual's capabilities. In the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norm functions, the distribution of value widens to a square of the distribution of individual actions, pointing to a tendency for widening of disparity among individuals. Since individuals in the upper end of the distribution of actions use more resources and gain more value than those in the lower end, the consumption of total resources would also increase along with the increase in the total value of the group. Realizing sustainable, fair, and inclusive societies, such as by reducing income disparity and inequalities, ensuring access to energy, protection of the environment, and other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations (United Nations, 2018), entail not only considering utility in terms of value in society, but also require fostering progressive tax-like norms that are excellent in sustainability and fairness. The progressive tax-like norms here is based on individual values, not ex-post social security, but fostered in the ongoing interaction between individuals, and that eventually bring a progressive tax result at a group's state of equilibrium.
In regard to the effect of the distribution of actions, results of simulation showed that the normal distribution has higher resource productivity, albeit only slightly, than power-law distribution, but significantly lower Gini coefficient. Since the power-law distribution has wider spread than the normal distribution, there is a tendency for those in the upper end of the distribution of actions to be also in the upper end of the distribution of values. Since the disparity in the distribution of values is wider for proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms, even for the normal distribution, in cases when the value obtained in the current period becomes an asset and affects the action in the next period, it can be easily inferred that the normal distribution will also eventually approach a widely spread distribution similar to the power-law distribution. In regard to how the distribution of assets arise in the first place, it is known that the random-sharing model, where assets are randomly shared between two parties, exhibits an exponential distribution (Chakraborti and Chakrabarti, 2010 ), while the model for performing exchange and saving of assets exhibits a shift from a distribution similar to a normal distribution to that similar to a power-law distribution as the ratio of the savings against assets decreases (change in gamma distribution parameter) (Angle, 2006) . Consequently, as long as assets are exchanged, the distribution of actions in the initial period of the resource-sharing problem approaches the power-law distribution, and if the value obtained in the current period becomes an asset, the disparity in value and assets in the next periods will recursively expand for proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms. These relationships are similar to the r>g (return on capital > economic growth) configuration shown by Thomas Piketty in regard to capitalization rate and economic growth rate (Piketty, 2014) .
In the progressive tax-like norm based on the fairness criteria (value/action ratio), although it is possible to maintain and prevent the increase of disparity of the original action distribution, it is not possible to modify the original action distribution itself. If the original distribution would be modified despite having an exchange of assets, a norm more rigid than the progressive tax-like norm would be necessary. Would it be possible, however, to foster such a norm? In developmental psychology, humans are said to possess moral norms pertaining to fairness and what's right and wrong from infancy (Surian et al., 2018) . These are norms, however, that arise for survival, such as physical safety and health instincts, wherein it is unlikely for humans to have instinctive norms more rigid than fairness. In cultural psychology, humans are said to acquire a value system through their families or schools at an early age, by the time they reach around 10 to 12 years old, wherein it is fairly difficult to change the mental program acquired at this stage (Hofstede et al., 2013) .
Therefore, humans are not expected to develop norms more rigid than fairness at home or in schools.
From the perspective of human history, the agricultural society began after the neolithic age around 8500 years BC, after evolving through the hunting-gathering society that came about after the birth of Homo sapiens around 200,000 years ago. The exchange of goods was a main practice, and norms on fairness must have already developed sufficiently in the beginning of the agricultural society.
The history of money began as a replacement to bartering; namely, the weighing currency came about as a measure of value around 3300 BC, and the precious metal currency came about as a means to save value around the 5th century BC. Capitalization began around the end of the 16th century, and asset management began around the beginning of the 18th century. Therefore, only a mere 0.2% of human history has passed since capitalization and asset management started. Norms more rigid than fairness were not recorded even during the axial age from around 800 BC to 200 BC, a period that produced many philosophers and thinkers. Humans, therefore, still do not possess the norms needed for properly adapting to capitalization and asset management.
Therefore, we believe that it is imperative to prevent deviations from occurring in the original distribution of actions, to generate value through norms based on fairness, to increase sustainability, and to suppress disparity. In other words, there is a need to eliminate the conversion of generated values into assets and the exchange of assets, and to aim for a society where economic activities are carried out based on progressive tax-like norms. A globalized economic society, however, may not be receptive to adapting progressive tax-like norms. Kaushik Basu explained the importance of international policy coordination aimed at anti-poverty and inequality mitigation, while also talking about the difficulty and the hope of achieving them (Basu, 2010) . In our present world, there are tax havens that allow rich people to avoid taxes, some countries grant tax relief to attract and nurture companies, and taxation measures centered on consumption tax (proportional tax) are being implemented, showing that international coordination on tax policies is still something far in the future.
What should we do, therefore? One hope that we have is in the transformation from global to local and into a regional and community economy (Hiroi, 2009) . This is related to patronizing regional cuisine, promoting local production for local consumption, use of renewable energy, focus on local ties and culture, and other advocacies forwarded by Helena Norberg-Hodge, Junko Edahiro, and others (Norberg-Hodge, 2016; Edahiro, 2018) . We would like to rethink the three patterns (reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange) in economic society forwarded by Karl Polanyi (Polanyi, 1977) as reciprocal coordination and sharing through mutual expectation and recognition, redistribution and resetting of assets through progressive tax-like norms, and equal exchange and stockless economic cycling, with a focus on the region and community as the target for social practice, towards the establishment of an ideal, self-reliant local society. In addition, by incorporating progressive tax-like norms into the design of regional currency, including the depreciation of money put forward by Silvio Gessell, we believe that we will be able to guarantee sustainability and fairness at least within the region or community.
Effects
Conventionally, decision-making theories have focused only on utility functions, e.g. the game theory measures utility based on the payoff matrix or the logic tree, while welfare economics has made logical definitions of institutionalized mechanisms based on axiomatic approaches. In this paper, we introduced a value function that adds norm function in addition to utility function, and 24 conducted a numerical simulation of a mathematically modeled resource-sharing problem to compute resource productivity and Gini coefficients while comparing concrete modalities for social norms, enabling us to arrive at suggestions regarding sustainability and fairness. The approach presented in this paper has the potential to contribute in social practices aimed at realizing a society based on social norms, through mutual complementation with decision-making theories, experimental economic theories, welfare economic theories, and other theories.
Our approach, which incorporates both aspects of utility and norm, to the resource-sharing problem can also be applied to problems in the real world where there is competition for resources, such as in energy demand and supply, traffic congestion, and the supply chain. A similar approach can also be applied to problems other than the resource-sharing problem and other distributed optimization problems, such as to the knapsack problem for selecting a variety of commodities, the multiobjective optimization problem for operating passenger buses, and the travelling salesman problem for delivering local services, and may be useful in discussing sustainability, fairness, disparity, and other issues.
As the future society that Japan should aspire to realize, the Japanese government has proposed the vision for Society 5.0. Society 5.0 is defined as a "human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space" (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2014) and succeeds the hunting society Society 5.0 aims to solve social problems such as the redistribution of wealth and the remediation of regional disparities, as well as enable an active and enjoyable life for everyone. Similarly, the SDGs adopted by the United Nations are aimed at eradication of poverty and hunger, reduction of income disparity and inequality, affordable energy and environmental preservation, inclusive employment and institutions, etc. to realize a sustainable, diverse, and inclusive society for all (United Nations, 2018) . Achieving these goals requires a consideration of social norms, morals, and ethics, such as impartiality, fairness, virtue, and justice, as well as the implementation of normativity and ethics, other than utility in terms of convenience and efficiency of products and services, into IT systems.
Therefore a system is proposed that fuses social systems and IT systems, and in which IT systems perform diagnosis and prognosis of social systems and carry out real-time normative and ethical interventions to social systems based on the diagnosis and prognosis, as shown in Figure 12 ( Deguchi et al., 2018a, b; Karasawa et al., 2018) . In this fused system, IT systems carry out normative intervention in the different layers; namely, in the micro-level individual decisionmaking and actions, the macro-level interactions between individuals, and the meta-level social institutions. Although the norm-fostering process based on mutual expectation and recognition proposed in this paper mainly relate to the inter-individual interaction layer, since individuals are made up of the subject, object (action), and a mutual recognition with others, and institutions are created from recursive cycles of individual actions and group states of equilibrium, the normfostering process therefore also in fact relates to the individual and institutional layers.
Implementing the norm-fostering process proposed in this paper to IT systems, for example, in the inter-individual interaction layer, will entail the mutual exchange of information on value/action ratios and the mutual transmission of votes and appraisals through IT interfaces. For the individual layer, it will involve nudging and persuasion using behavioral science to promote normative actions. And for the institutional layer, it will involve the provision of information pertaining to predicted equilibrium states and scenarios to facilitate the generation of shared expectations. We plan to carry out concrete trials regarding the implementation of IT systems and the modalities of the norms explained in this paper through social verification experiments on self-sufficiency of renewable energy and supply chains for local production for local consumption, towards the establishment of self-reliant regional societies that are sustainable, fair, and inclusive.
Figure 12
Normative intervention of social systems by IT systems in Society 5.0.
Summary
Conclusions
Towards the realization of a sustainable and fair society, we introduced a decision-making model based on value functions that include utility function and norm function, and proposed a normfostering process that recursively updates norm function through mutual expectation and recognition between the self and others. Moreover, we conducted numerical simulation using the resource-sharing problem, and showed that the progressive tax-like norm, which is based on the value/action ratio, is preferable over proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms in terms of resource productivity (sustainability) and Gini coefficient (fairness).
(1) We incorporated the social norm function in addition to the individual utility function into the decision-making model in terms of normative appropriateness and moral cost from the standpoint of deontology, and in terms of social exchange cost and social preferences from the standpoint of utilitarianism. Further, we proposed a norm-fostering process that recursively and gradually updates norm functions while repeating cycles of mutual expectation and recognition, in terms social learning and mutual expectation based on conformity from the standpoint of the cultural evolutionary theory, and in terms of mutual recognition that serves as basis for the group's shared expectation from the standpoint of social institutional theory.
(2) We looked at the resource-sharing problem as a typical example pertaining to the competition for shared resources related to production activities, allocation of resources and energy, traffic congestion, and the supply chain. After estimating the increasing cost function for resource unit price and the diminishing return function for utility, we defined three norm functions (progressive tax-like, proportional tax-like, and fixed tax-like) for comparison. In the computational flow for progressive tax-like norm function, the norm function was recursively updated through mutual comparison with others using value/action ratio based on the equity theory as criteria.
(3) Results of numerical simulation of the normal distribution and power-law distribution of actions assuming a scale-free network for a group of 100 persons showed that, for both types of distribution of actions, value is proportional to action in the progressive tax-like norm, while values exhibit the square function of actions for the proportional tax-like and fixed taxlike norms, leading to increase in disparity. In regard to the group's total value and total resources, it was found that they were larger in the power-law distribution than in the normal distribution, that they were also larger in the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms than in the progressive tax-like norm, and that individuals in the upper end of the distribution of actions use more resources and gain more value than those in the lower end of the distribution for the proportional tax-like and fixed tax-like norms. Looking at these results from another perspective, we could say that the progressive tax-like norm results in the highest resource productivity and the lowest Gini coefficient, meaning that it exhibits the highest sustainability and fairness compared to the other norms.
Future prospects
We will continue to hope for a global coordination in international policies, as we move ahead in conducting trials for social practices in local regions and communities, in order to foster a norm that not only seeks utility in terms of profits or benefits as a social value but also has excellent sustainability and fairness. Going forward, we would like to take the first step towards achieving sustainability and fairness in the region and community, more than as a nation or internationally, by aiming for coordination and sharing based on reciprocal and mutual expectation and recognition, redistribution and resetting of assets through norms, and equal exchange and stockless economic cycling, as well as by considering the design of institutions and regional currency.
The design and fostering process for norm functions reported in this paper point to, so to speak, a clinical medical prescription and a practical method for intervention of social systems. One of the next issues that need to be addressed is to diagnose separately utility functions and normative functions from behavioral data of individuals and groups in the real world, and to apply the diagnosis to prescriptions. In addition, it is to determine the effect free-riders and offenders have on sustainability and fairness, in other words when the intervention based on the prescription is not effective, and investigate the homeostasis in the cycling and maintenance of social groups. Another issue is to determine the effects of regional and community culture and reevaluate the design of norms and methods of intervention that are suitable to value systems and customs. We will endeavor to contribute to the realization of a better society through these activities.
